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THEGOALSOFE~ONMENTAL 
LEGISLATION 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY* 
Abstract: In the past thirty years, Congress has enacted and revised 
numerous statutes involving environmental protection. Federal public 
policy toward environmental pollution has evolved during this time to 
respond to changing societal needs and new information about the 
impacts of federal regulation. This Essay will discuss the two broad 
categories into which regulatory goals of agencies fall: acceptable risk 
goals and pollution reduction goals. Each of these broad categories, in 
turn, contains subcategories. Environmental legislation often contains a 
mix of these goals, and only by examining the complex interaction 
among them, can the statutory language that specifies the implement-
ation details correctly be understood. Current suggestions for reform 
would implement a single, simplistic cost-benefit analysis. The present, 
complex regulatory system allows regulations to meet varying goals, and 
Congress should be wary of attempts to impose perfection through 
unidimensional approaches to setting environmental policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the thirty-plus years since environmentalism first exploded 
onto the American political agenda, Congress has enacted and revised 
dozens of statutes that directly or indirectly attempt to protect the en-
vironment} Many of these laws are regulatory in nature; they are de-
signed to change private conduct in ways that will help preserve and 
protect human health and the environment.2 Such laws invariably 
delegate the details of implementation to a regulatory agency that is 
* W.James Kronzer Chair in Trial and Appellate Advocacy, University of Texas School 
of Law and President, Center For Progressive Regulation. 
1 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000) 
(regulating the use, storage, and handling of hazardous materials in the workplace); Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 
(2000) (regulating the discharge of pollutants into the nation's waterways, primarily 
through source-specific, technology-based regulations); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401-7671 (2000) (aiming to reduce pollution levels in the Nation's air through harm-
based national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS». 
2 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671. 
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empowered to set standards, write regulations, and issue permits, all 
of which are designed to protect the ern ironment to some degree.:'! 
An article of faith in the policy sciences is that one of the first 
steps in designing a governmental program is to articulate the goals 
that are to be achieved.4 Yet, in the legislative frenzy that usually pre-
cedes the enactment of major environmental legislation, few of the 
active participants dwell on the immediate goals of particular protec-
tive programs, and the resulting statutes are often filled with horta-
tory and sometimes contradictory phrases that offer little guidance to 
the implementing agency.!> Hence, it is often difficult in retrospect to 
tell whether the agency has successfully implemented a particular 
statutory provision or whether a particular legislative approach to pol-
lution control has worked. Disputes over whether a program has been 
successful often mask disputes over what the program's goals should 
have been in the first place. 
At first glance, a study of the goals of environmental statutes 
might appear superfluous. The goal of all environmental statutes is, of 
course, to protect and enhance the human environment. While this is 
undoubtedly true, a goal so broadly stated is essentially meaningless, 
because it begs the question of how much protection is enough. Since 
environmental protection always requires some effort, how much ef-
fort shall we expend? How much is too much? How much degrada-
tion shall we tolerate before concluding that the environment is no 
longer protected? How much cleanup is required until the environ-
ment has been enhanced? 
IT we are to understand the goals of environmental legislation, we 
must forego generalities and tighten the analysis to focus on the imme-
diate regulatory goals of particular programs created by the environ-
mental laws, and on how those immediate goals interrelate within the 
overall statutory fabric. Viewed at this less abstract level, it becomes ap-
parent that the immediate regulatory goals of most environmental pro-
3 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 122-124 (2004) (outlining the regulatory provisions to be im-
plemented under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program 
under the CWA); 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2004) (detailing the regulatory requirements involving 
NAAQS under the CAA). 
4 See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III & IRA SHARRANSKY, THE POLICY PREDICAMENT 7 (1978); 
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS 13 (Robert A. Dahl ed., Prentice-
Ha1l2d ed. 1986). 
5 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 323-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (in-
volving a dispute over whether a vague provision of the CAA granted EPA discretion to list 
certain substances as criteria pollutants). 
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grams fall into two broad categories-acceptable risk goals6 and pollu-
tion reduction goals.7 Each of these categories, in turn, contains sub-
categories. Moreover, the statutes frequently provide for overlapping 
programs in which one goal dominates up to a point, and then the 
other takes over.s Only by studying the complex interaction among dif-
ferent statutory goals can we truly understand and interpret the statu-
tory language that specifies the implementation details. The failure to 
engage in this detailed analysis can lead to faulty statutory interpreta-
tion and embarrassing mis-citation of existing legal authorities.9 
An understanding of how the immediate statutory goals of envi-
ron men tal legislation interrelate is also essential to the recurring politi-
cal debates over the future of environmental legislation. While retro-
spective reevaluation of governmental programs is always in order in an 
open democratic society, some criticisms of existing environmental laws 
have betrayed little appreciation for the sophistication with which the 
current edifice was constructed. lo Moreover, the unidimensional solu-
tions at the top of some reformers' agendas appear in the real world of 
environmental regulation to represent little more than political slo-
ganeering. ll Before we toss out thirty years' worth of statutory evolution 
in the name of common sense, we ought at least attempt to appreciate 
the common sense of the current statutory regime. In particular, Con-
gress and the Administration should not lightly replace the existing 
6 See. e.g., eM 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (generally mandating a harm-based approach 
to regulating air pollution by setting maximum allowable levels of certain pollutants in the 
air based on human health and environmental quality considerations). 
7 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (establishing a regime under which pollution 
discharges into the nation's navigable waterways are regulated via source specific, technol-
ogy-based effluent standards). 
8 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (mandating that states switch to a harm-based, rather 
than a technology-based, approach to regulating pollution when the former does not re-
sult in fishable and swimmable waterways). 
9 See, e.g., Nat'l Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314, 324-25 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing, in-
appropriately, Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976), a Supreme 
Court opinion concerning the implementation of media-quality standards in a dispute 
involving implemen tation of technology-based standards). 
10 See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALl. ET AL., AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH 
& THE BROOKINGS INST., AN AGENDA FOR FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM 3-6, 12-16 
(1997) (maintaining that federal regulation "urgently needs repair" and even advocating 
eight particular reforms based upon a simplistic, four-page analysis of the existing regula-
tory system). 
11 See, e.g., FRED L. SMITH, THE COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., ECo-SOCIALlSM: THREAT 
TO LIBERTY AROUND THE WORLD 1-3 (2004) (maintaining that "[t]he Greens of today 
pose a threat to liberty as great as the Reds of yesterday"). Competitive Enterprise Institute 
President Fred Smith argues against both "command-and-control" regulation and "market-
based regulation" and in favor of greater protections for private property rights. ld. 
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complex web of environmental law with a single, simplistic cost-benefit 
mandate. 
I. ACCEPTABLE RISK GOALS 
The goal of many environmental programs is to reduce human and 
environmental exposure to environmental contaminants to a level that 
poses acceptable risks to health and the environment.12 Underlying this 
goal is the presumption that the implementing agency is capable of 
measuring or predicting the extent of human or environmental expo-
sure to the contaminant at issue, assessing the risks posed by that level 
and alternative exposure levels, and determining a level of risk that is 
acceptable for those entities exposed to the contaminants.13 The imme-
diate regulatory goal is to ensure that potentially exposed humans or 
environmental entities are not exposed to levels of the contaminant that 
pose unacceptable risks. l4 Acceptable risk goals can be divided into 
three categories, depending upon how the agency goes about determin-
ing the acceptability of the risk: zero risk/preservationist goals;15 
significant risk/protective goals;16 and reasonable risk/balancing 
goalsP 
A. Zero Risk/Preservationist 
The goal of absolute preservation admits of no man-made depar-
tures from natural or background levels of environmental quality. Al-
though natural risks may be unavoidable, risks of human origin are 
intolerable. For consumer products and industrial residuals, the zero 
risk goal is roughly the equivalent of wilderness preservation. Perhaps 
the best known example of a statute with a zero risk goal is the De-
laney Clause of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which provides that 
12 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (establishing harm-based ambient standards for air pollu-
tion that seek to limit human health and environmental injuries to acceptable levels). 
IS See 40 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2004) (defining NAAQS under the CAA as "levels of air quality 
which the Administrator [of EPA] judges are necessary, with an adequate margin of safety, 
to protect the public health"). 
14 See id. 
15 See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c) (3) (A) (2000) (prohibit-
ing the use of carcinogenic substances in food sold across state lines). 
16 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (b) (1) (regulating air pollutants at levels below those pos-
ing a risk to human health and the environment). 
17 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(1) 
(2000) (mandating that EPA approve the use of a pesticide only if it determines that the 
proper use of the chemical will not pose the risk of causing "unreasonable adverse effects 
on the environment"). 
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no substance that has been shown to cause cancer in laboratory ani-
mals may be deliberately added to food that is marketed in interstate 
commerce}8 
Statutory provisions aimed at achieving a zero risk goal are often 
attacked as impractical.19 For example, Justice Stephen Breyer has ar-
gued that society should not expend disproportionate resources try-
ing to reduce or eliminate "'the last 10 percent''' of the risks posed by 
environmental contaminants.20 Although their defenders frequently 
invoke rights-oriented arguments to counter the critics' concerns for 
economic efficiency, zero risk goals are occasionally based upon a leg-
islative judgment that the benefits of a particular activity are so trivial 
that they can justifY the imposition of no additional risks on society. 
For example, supporters of the Delaney clause in the context of color 
additives suggest that the desire of a food processor to hide the real 
color of its product from the consuming public cannot justifY any ad-
ditional cancer riskS.21 
B. Significant Risk/Protective 
Several provisions in the environmental statutes require the im-
plementing agency to set standards at a level that will protect the public 
health or the environment, sometimes with a margin of safety thrown 
in for good measure. For example, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 
required the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set National 
Primary Ambient Air Quality Standards for certain ubiquitous pollut-
ants at a level sufficient to protect the public health with an "adequate 
margin of safety. "22 
18 See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (A)-(B) (2003). The original Endangered Species Act 
adopted an absolutist position with respect to the preservation of endangered species. See 
87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-74 
(1978) (recognizing that "[i]t may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively 
small number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would 
require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has ex-
pended more than $100 million," but nevertheless interpreting the statute to "require 
precisely that result") . 
19 See Cass R. Sun stein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
488-89 (1989) (advocating a principle of judicial review allowing de minimis exceptions 
from statutes pursuing zero risk/preservationist goals). 
20 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING TIlE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGU-
LATION 11 (1993). 
21 See Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (1987) (rejecting the Food and Drug 
Administration's de minimis interpretation of the Delaney Clause regarding carcinogenic 
color additives) . 
2242 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1). 
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Although such programs might appear at first glance to be aimed 
at advancing zero risk/preservationist goals, an important Supreme 
Court precedent involving the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 suggests otherwise. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. 
American Petroleum Institute (Benz.ene), the Supreme Court reviewed a 
challenge to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's 
(OSHA) standard for protecting workers from benzene.23 OSHA took 
the position that the phrase '''reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment'" in 
the definition of "'occupational safety or health standard'" required 
the agency to set the standard at a level that allowed zero risk, unless 
attaining that level was not feasible. 24 For substances like carcinogens, 
for which a "no-effect" level could not be determined, OSHA resolved 
to set health standards at the lowest "feasible" level.25 The Supreme 
Court, however, held that the word "safe" did not mean "risk-free. "26 
According to the Court, the statute "was not designed to require em-
ployers to provide absolutely risk-free workplaces whenever it is tech-
nologically feasible to do so, so long as the cost is not great enough to 
destroy an entire industry. "27 Instead, the statute "was intended to re-
quire the elimination, as far as feasible, of significan t risks of harm. "28 
More than two decades after the Supreme Court's decision, it is 
fair to conclude that statutes that require the implementing agency to 
set a standard at the level that protects the public health do not adopt 
a zero risk/preservationist goal. Instead, the goal of such statutes is to 
protect the relevant beneficiaries from "significant" risks. The Benz.ene 
plurality opinion strongly suggested that applying this significant risk 
test to environmental standard setting is a two-step process. First, the 
agency must assess the risks posed by status quo exposures and alter-
native exposure levels.29 For some kinds of risks, e.g., the risks posed 
by carcinogenic substances, elaborate quantitative risk assessment 
models are available for performing this first step.30 Since risk assess-
ment is still more of an art than a science, however, the competing 
25 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980). 
24 See id. A separate provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act placed a fea-
sibility limitation on occupational health standards. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b) (5). 
25 See Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 624 n.19. 
26 See id. at 639-41. 
27Id. at 641. 
28Id. 
29 See id. at 614-15. 
30 See id. at 635-36. 
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models often yield widely divergent predictions.31 Moreover, quantita-
tive models only exist for a few kinds of environmental risks.32 Risk 
assessment is therefore often a very imprecise business, and risk pro-
jections are invariably characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. 
The second step is the policy~ominated determination of whether 
a given level ofrisk is "significant."33 This typically involves a host of in-
commensurable considerations, including: (1) the "robustness" of the 
data and the uncertainties in the risk predictions; (2) the size of the 
exposed populations; (3) the intensity of the exposures to particular 
individuals; (4) the nature of the harm potentially induced by the ex-
posure; (5) the duration ofthe exposure; (6) the value of the resources 
at risk; (7) the degree to which the exposure is voluntary; (8) the ex-
tent to which society tolerates similar risks in other contexts; and (9) 
distributional considerations.34 The complexity of these considerations 
and the uniqueness of most environmental insults makes it very 
difficult to reduce the significance determination to a single generic 
exercise. Nevertheless, in a relentlessly reductionist pursuit of consis-
tency, some risk assessment advocates have insisted upon tying the 
significance determination to a single level of predicted risk, such as a 
one-in-one-million risk of death to the maximally exposed individuaJ.35 
Whatever the difficulties in applying the significance concept to 
health and environmental risks, it seems reasonably clear that the 
significant risk/protective goal does not involve a balancing of health 
and environmental risks against costs and other inconveniences en-
tailed in reducing the risks. In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. 
Donovan, a follow-up case to the Benzene case, the textile industry ar-
gued that in deciding whether an occupational health standard was 
"reasonably necessary and appropriate" to providing a safe workplace, 
OSHA was obliged to balance the costs of alternative approaches to 
cleaning up the workplace against the resulting risk reduction 
benefits.36 The Court held that so long as the risks being addressed 
31 See Peter F. Stone, Comment, The SilfTlificant lUsk Requirement in OSHA Regulation of 
Carcinogens: Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 551, 564 n.68 (1981). 
32 See David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1857, 
1864-65 (1995) (noting "the lack of sophisticated methods to evaluate noncancer risks" 
and the fact that "there are no formal methods to allow us to compare, for instance, risks 
of benzene with those oflead"). 
33 See Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 642-56. 
34 See id. 
:15 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2) (A) (2000). 
36 See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 504 (1981). 
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were significant. the agency could require employers to implement 
feasible risk reduction technologies, even if it could not demonstrate 
that the value of death and disease prevented was equal to the cost of 
implementing those technologies.37 Similarly, the Court has held that 
an ambient air quality standard under the Clean Air Act must be set at 
a level that protects the public health without regard to the cost of 
achieving that level.38 
C. Reasonable Risk/Balancing 
The utilitarian goal for health and environmental regulation is a 
world in which humans may freely disrupt the environment up to the 
point at which the pain caused by the risks that their activities pose to 
humans and environmental entities just equals the pleasure derived 
from the activities that generate those risks. Phrased somewhat differ-
ently, pollution should be allowed up to the point at which the cost of 
pollution controls exceeds the benefits. The fundamental premise un-
derlying the cost-benefit balancing goal is that society is willing to ac-
cept reasonable risks.39 As with the significant risk/margin of safety ap-
proach to determining acceptable risk, cost-benefit balancing relies 
heavily upon quantitative risk assessment techniques.40 The latter ap-
proach varies from the former in that it also calls for quantification of 
the costs of reducing risks and for comparing those costs to the 
monetized benefit of the reduced risks.41 The costs in turn depend 
upon the existence and expense of pollution control technologies and 
process technologies designed to reduce pollution.42 
In addition to all of the practical impediments and uncertainties 
entailed in risk assessment, an agency attempting to achieve a reason-
able risk/balancing goal encounters similar difficulties in estimating 
the direct and indirect costs of taking the actions necessary to reduce 
health or environmental risks.43 Since it is often very hard for agen-
cies to predict how regula tees will react to effluent or emissions limi-
37 See id. at 535-36. 
38 See WhiUnan v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457,471 (2001). 
39 SeeEDWARDJ. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 310-20 (1976). 
40 See id. 
41 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE (forthcoming 2004); 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 111-23 (1991) [hereinafter MCGARITY, REINVENTING RA-
TIONALITY]. 
42 See Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulation, SO TEX. L. REv. 1997, 2005-07 (2002). 
43 See MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY, supra note 41, at 136-37 nn.S8-91. 
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tations, they must rely on the regulated companies themselves for the 
information underlying cost estimates, and the companies have every 
incentive to err on the high side.44 
Having produced a quantitative risk assessment and a dollar es-
timate of the costs of alternative risk reduction possibilities, the 
agency must still reduce the two estimates to a common metric. This 
heavily value-laden exercise is perhaps the most serious impediment 
to achieving the balancing goal. Proponents of cost-benefit analysis 
have not produced a technique for quantifying noncommodity values 
that has commanded any agreement outside of a small group of spe-
cialists in regulatory analysis.45 As a result, agencies attempting to 
achieve the reasonable risk/balancing goal typically forego the quan-
titative approach in favor of a qualitative and highly subjective consid-
eration of the pros and cons of various regulatory options.46 
Cost-benefit balancing is a frequently encountered goal in statutes 
that call for case-by-case licensing of particular products or activities. 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act allows EPA to 
register pesticides that will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on 
the environment" and requires EPA to cancel the registrations of pesti-
cides later found to cause unreasonable adverse effects. 47 The term 
"unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" is defined to mean 
"any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account 
the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use 
of any pesticide. "48 Similarly, the Toxic Substances Control Act empow-
ers EPA to take one of several enumerated regulatory actions with re-
spect to any chemical substance that presents an "unreasonable risk of 
injury to health or the environment. "49 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit has held that this language requires EPA to balance the 
costs and benefits of several regulatory alternatives prior to taking regu-
44 See McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 42, at 2005-07. 
45 See MCGARI"IY ET AL., supra note 41, at 163-89. 
46 See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 548 F.2d 998, 1005-08 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (reviewing an order of EPA suspending the registration of heptachlor and chlor-
dane under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act); Envtl. Def. Fund, 
Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 510 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (examining a similar 
petition regarding EPA's order both suspending the registration of and prohibiting the 
manufacture and sale of aldrin and dieldrin); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
489 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reviewing EPA's order canceling most registra-
tions for the use of DDT). 
477 U.S.C. § 136a(d) (1) (C) (2000). 
48 [d. § 136(bb). 
49 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
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latory action.50 EPA decision making in both contexts has been notori-
ously complex and time-consuming.51 Pesticide cancellations require 
many years of data gathering, analysis, and hearings, and the prospect 
of similarly complex proceedings under TSCA in light of the Fifth Cir-
cuit opinion has caused EPA to abandon virtually all attempts to reduce 
the risks posed by existing chemicals under that statute. 
II. POLLUTION REDUCTION GOALS 
At the dawn of the modern environmental era, during the late 
1960s, advocates of environmental protection legislation debated the 
relative merits of national media quality standards versus national emis-
sions standards.52 The proponents of media quality standards offered 
legislation requiring EPA to prescribe concentrations of ubiquitous pol-
lutants in receiving media capable of meeting acceptable risk goals.5!! 
The advocates of national emissions standards had something very dif-
ferent in mind. Rather than focusing on the health and environmental 
effects of various pollutants in the receiving media, the agency would 
focus, on an industry-by-industry basis, upon the pollution control 
technologies and manufacturing process changes that could reduce the 
discharge of pollutants. 54 Industry-wide limitations would be set on the 
basis of what companies in each industry were capable of achieving, 
whether or not the air or water into which they discharged "needed" 
such limitations in order to attain an acceptable level of environmental 
quality. The goal was simply to ensure that all sources in the polluting 
industries made an adequate effort to reduce pollution. As the primary 
environmental statutes have evolved over the last twenty-five years, the 
pollution reduction goal has assumed an increasingly prominent role.55 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
adopted a pollution reduction goal for both new and existing dis-
50 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214-15, 1226-27 
(5th Cir. 1991). 
51 See id. at 1214-15; Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the 
ParadilfTRS and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALEJ. ON REG. 369, 388-92 (1993); 
see generally Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Reso-
lution of Science Policy QJ.testions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. LJ. 729, 
809 (1979) [hereinafter McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion] . 
52 See JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION 239-51 (1992);J. CLARENCE DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 55 (1970). 
55 See BONINE & MCGARITY, supra note 52, at 239-51; DAVIES, supra note 52, at 55. 
54 See BONINE & MCGARITY, supra note 52, at 239-51; DAVIES, supra note 52, at 55. 
55 See generaUy Wendy E. Wagner, Innovations in Environmental Policy: The Triumph of 
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83. 
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chargers of water pollutants. The amendments required new sources 
to install the "best available demonstrated control technology," and 
that existing sources install the "best practicable control technology 
currently available" by 1977 and "best available technology economi-
cally achievable" by 1983.56 In the Clean Water Act of 1977, Congress 
extended the deadlines and refocused the program to give greater 
prominence to toxic discharges.57 Congress amended the statute once 
again in 1987 to extend the deadlines still further and to address non-
industrial sources more comprehensively. 58 Nevertheless, the technol-
ogy-based standards that originated in 1972 still form the bedrock of 
the Clean Water Act's regulatory regime.59 
While the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 aimed primarily at 
achieving the significant risk/protectionist goal of attaining the na-
tional ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), by 1977 it was becom-
ing apparent that the exclusive focus on media quality was not work-
ing.5O Although retaining the acceptable risk goals underlying the 
NAAQS, Congress launched several new programs aimed at achieving 
pollution reduction goals. New major stationary sources in nonat-
tainment areas had to install technology capable of achieving the 
"lowest achievable emissions rate"; existing stationary sources in those 
areas had to install "reasonably available con trol technology"; and ma-
jor emitting facilities in attainment areas had to install the "best avail-
able" control technology.61 Further amendments in 1990 retained an 
air quality-based regime based on the NAAQS, but added a host of 
new requirements aimed at achieving pollution reduction goals.62 
In the 1970s, Congress could adopt relatively ambitious pollution 
reduction goals on the confident assumption that pollution was so se-
vere that the expense of installing EPA-prescribed technology was 
nearly always justified by the resulting health and environmental gains. 
Pollution control advocates in Congress no doubt also recognized that 
technology-based standards aimed at attaining pollution reduction 
56 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972. Pub. L. No. 
92-500, § 301 (b) (1)-(2).86 Stat. 896 (1972). 
57 SeeFWPCAAmendments ofl977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 56, 91 Stat. 1591-92 (1977). 
58 See FWPCA Amendments of 1987. Pub. L. No. 10~. §§ 301-06. 101 Stat. 29-37 
(1987). 
59 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
60 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND So-
CIETY 445-46 (2d. ed. 1998). 
61 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). 
62 See infra notes 70-73, 88-91,123-126 and accompanying text (describing these new 
programs). 
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goals require less analysis and reliance on speculative dispersion and 
dose-response models than media quality-based standards aimed at 
achieving acceptable risk goals. An agency pursuing a pollution reduc-
tion goal must shoulder the considerable burden of categorizing the 
relevant industries, identifying model technologies, and preparing 
economic and financial analyses, but it does not have to attempt to 
monitor existing ambient media quality, assess health and environ-
mental risks, calculate the proper pollution reduction load, and allo-
cate that load among the existing sources of the relevant pollutants. 
Administrative efficiency, however, was not the only reason for 
adopting a pollution reduction goal. The gradual move toward tech-
nology-based standards also reflected a lack of congressional faith in 
EPA and state agencies to determine the level of pollution that 
reflects an acceptable risk goal and to ensure that discharges do not 
result in ambient concentrations that exceed those levels. In addition, 
Congress was unwilling to allow dischargers of pollutants to use the 
assimilative capacity of the natural environment without first making 
some effort to reduce their emissions at the source. Finally, in the case 
of non-threshold pollutants, Congress may have decided that since 
any discharge subjects humans and the environment to some degree 
of risk, sources of those pollutants should do something to reduce 
those discharges, whether or not they contributed to a significant risk 
of disease or environmental damage. 
A. Best Efforts 
When Congress wants EPA to require sources to adopt the very 
best pollution reduction technologies and process changes, it uses su-
perlatives in identifying the required level of technological achieve-
ment and it minimizes the extent to which the agency may consider 
cost. The Clean Water Act of 1977 requires direct dischargers of toxic 
pollutants to meet effluent limitations based upon the "best available 
technology economically achievable. "63 This standard may be based 
upon the single best performing plant in an industrial subcategory.64 
Indeed, it is not necessary that EPA be able to point to any existing 
6! 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b) (2) (A). The "best available technology" requirement also applies 
to dischargers of so-called "grey area" pollutants that have not been listed as toxic pollut-
ants, but are not among the conventional pollutants that ordinary sewage treatment plants 
are capable of treating. See id. § 1311 (b) (2) (F). 
64 See Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 870 F.2d 177, 226-27, modified 885 F.2d 
253 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Congress intended these limitations to be based on the performance 
of the single best-performing plant in an industrial field."). 
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source that meets the requirements for all of the pollutants discharged 
by plants in the subcategory, so long as a single plant can be identified 
that can meet the limitation for each of the pollutants.65 In other 
words, the agency can to some extent engage in a leap of faith. 66 Cost 
considerations playa role in prescribing effluent limitations based on 
best available technology, but they do not playa dominant role.67 
Mter the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, new and modified 
major emitting facilities in "clean air" areas must install "the best avail-
able control technology. "68 New and modified major stationary sources 
in "nonattainment" areas must attain the "lowest achievable emission 
rate," a term that is defined to mean "the most stringent emission limi-
tation" contained in any state implementation plan (SIP) for the rele-
vant class or category or the "most stringent emission limitation which 
is achieved in practice by such class or category, whichever is more 
stringen t. "69 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 added many more pollu-
tion reduction requirements aimed at achieving a "best efforts" goal. 
The amendments completely overhauled EPA's approach to writing 
national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs).70 
The standards for major sources must require "the maximum degree of 
reduction in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants ... achievable" 
(MACT), taking into account costs and non-air quality health and envi-
ronmental impacts and energy requirements.71 For new sources, MACT 
cannot be less stringent than "the emission control that is achieved in 
practice by the best controlled similar source. "72 For existing sources, 
65 See id. 
66 See Tanners' Council, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1195 (4th Cir. 1976) (EPA "may 
look to the best performer in the industry and even assess technologies that have not been 
applied as long as the record demonstrates that there is a reasonable basis to believe that 
the technology will be available [by the deadline]."). The courts, however, have been un-
willing to allow EPA to engage in very large leaps of faith. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 540 F.2d 1023, 1038-39 (10th Cir. 1976) ("Even if the 1983 flow reductions 
are unattainable by existing refineries, it does not follow that new plants could not be de-
signed so as to incorporate the means of attaining the lower flow rates."). 
67 See Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 206-07. 
68 See 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (a) (4) (2000). The best available technology determination 
must be made on a case-by-case basis and must take into account "energy, environmental, 
and economic impacts and other costs." 40 C.F.R. § 51.166 (2004). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 7501 (2), (3) (A)-(B). 
70 The statute contains a very long list of hazardous air pollutants for which EPA must 
write NESHAPs once it has identified classes and categories of sources of those pollutants. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). 
71 [d. § 7412(d) (2). 
72 [d. § 7412(d) (3). 
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MACT must be no less stringent than the average emission limitation 
achieved by the best performing twelve percent of the existing sources 
or, for categories with fewer than thirty sources, the average emission 
limitation achieved by the best performing five sources.73 
B. Reasonable Efforts 
Congress occasionally has been willing to settle for something less 
than best efforts in order to get things moving in the right direction. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 called 
for two rounds of technology innovation corresponding to the five-year 
permit cycle. While the second round called for "best available" tech-
nology, the first round only required the installation of "best practica-
ble" technology (BPT).74 In establishing BPT, EPA was required to con-
sider "the total cost of application of technology in relation to the 
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application. "75 
While this operation clearly involves some kind of balancing, EPA has 
steadfastly maintained that it does not require a detailed quantification 
of the costs and environmental benefits of alternative pollution reduc-
tion technologies. Rather, EPA simply assumes that a pound of pollut-
ant removed from any company's effluent stream is beneficial, whether 
or not it has any measurable positive impact on humans or the organ-
isms living in the receiving stream. Reasonableness is determined by 
cross-industry comparisons of the cost of removing a pound of the 
same pollutant and sometimes by searching for the "knee of the cost 
curve. "76 In effect, EPA concludes that the cost of installing a technol-
ogy is reasonable if the cost-per-pound of removing a given pollutant 
with that technology is not too different from the cost-per-pound of 
removing the same pollutant in an industry for which the agency has 
already promulgated a standard.77 
73Id. § 7412(d) (3) (A)-(B). 
74 SeeFWPCAAmendments of1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
75 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B). 
76 See Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 870 F.2d 177, 204-06 (5th Cir. 1989), 
modified 885 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1989). The knee of the cost curve is the point at which the 
cost-per-pound of removing additional amounts of a pollutant from the effluent stream 
escalates dramatically. EPA has taken the position that the knee of the curve inquiry is not 
required in establishing "best practicable technology," but may be required for establishing 
"best conventional control technology,· which represents a slightly more stringent level of 
pollution reduction for conventional pollutants. See id. at 205. 
77 See id. at 205-06; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1978); 
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 F.2d 1023, 1038 (10th Cir. 1976). 
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The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 required states containing 
nonattainment areas to amend their SIPs to require for the implemen-
tation of "reasonably available control measures," including "reasonably 
available control technology" (RACT) for stationary sources.'8 EPA has 
consistently taken the position that RACf "is the lowest emission limita-
tion that a particular source is capable of meeting by the application of 
control technology that is reasonably available considering technologi-
cal and economic feasibility."79 The Agency has promulgated "control 
techniques guidelines" for numerous polluting industries to assist the 
states in this regard.so As with BPT in the water context, the goal is not 
to require the top-of-the-line technology; rather, the goal is to ensure 
that reasonable steps are taken to reduce the existing pollution load. 
C. Waste Minimiz.ation/Source Reduction 
In recent years, regulatory attention has shifted from an almost 
exclusive focus on what can be done at the end of the pipe to what can 
be done throughout the manufacturing process to reduce discharges of 
pollutants into the environment. The goal of the Pollution Prevention 
Act of 1990, for example, is "source reduction," which is defined as any 
practice that either reduces the amount of a pollutant released into the 
environment or reduces the hazards to public health of such pollutants 
prior to recycling, treatment, or disposal. The term includes "equip-
ment or technology modifications, process or procedure modifications, 
reformulation or redesign of products, substitution of raw materials, 
and improvements in housekeeping, maintenance, training, or inven-
tory control. "81 The statute does not, however, empower EPA to impose 
any direct regulatory requirements except for an annual toxic chemical 
source reduction and recycling report. 82 
Section 211 of the Clean Air Act empowers EPA to regulate fuels 
and fuel additives.83 Among other things, section 211 allows EPA to 
register fuel and fuel additives, require manufacturers to conduct 
health and environmental testing on such fuels or additives, and write 
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (c) (1). 
79 See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 180 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING ACCEPTABILITY OF SIP REGULATIONS IN NON AT-
TAINMENT AREAS (1976». 
so See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.123 (2004). 
81 42 U.S.C. § 13102(5) (A) (ii); see Robert F. Blomquist, Government's Role Regarding In-
dustrialPollution Prevention in the United States, 29 GA. L. REv. 349, 386-87 (1995). 
Ill! See 42 U.S.C. § 13106(a). 
II!! Id. § 7545. 
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regulations to "control or prohibit" the manufacture and sale of a fuel 
additive if "any emission product of such fuel or fuel additive causes, 
or contributes, to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger the public health or welfare."84 Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s EPA exercised this power-in a rather incremental and 
halting fashion-to phase the fuel additive tetraethyllead out of gaso-
line.55 The result was a dramatic drop in ambient levels of lead in ur-
ban areas and a corresponding drop in blood lead levels in urban 
residents.86 Airborne lead is no longer the major pollution problem 
that it once was, because EPA very directly eliminated the largest 
source oflead air pollution in the United States. 
The 1990 Amendments tackled the almost intractable problem of 
acid rain directly, by requiring EPA to establish a system of emissions 
limitations and marketable permits in sulfur dioxide emissions that 
will reduce the overall amount of sulfur dioxide emitted by power 
plants in the Midwest by ten million tons from 1980 levels.87 The re-
duction in overall emissions is to come in two phases. Phase I, which 
began in 1995, brought about a 3.5 million ton reduction in sulfur 
dioxide emissions by controlling the largest and dirtiest coal-fired 
power plants.88 Phase II had to bring about a reduction of 10 million 
tons below 1980 levels by subjecting all utility sulfur dioxide emissions 
to an annual cap of 8.9 million tons per year. 59 This highly compli-
cated statutory scheme is primarily aimed at achieving a pollution re-
duction goal of eliminating 10 million tons of sulfur dioxide emis-
sions per year.90 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also requires every 
generator of hazardous wastes to certifY that it has a program in place 
"to reduce the volume or quantity and toxicity of such waste to the 
degree determined by the generator to be economically practica-
Sf Id. § 7545 (c) (1). 
86 See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 705 F.2d 506 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
86 See MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY, supra note 41, at 29-44. 
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (b). 
88 Id. § 7651c. 
88 Id. §§ 7651c-d. During Phase n, EPA must allocate marketable pollution allowances 
to all fossil fuel fired utility units, with most units receiving allowances that would require 
emissions reductions (including further reductions for Phase I units). Id. § 7651d. The 
statute establishes sulfur dioxide "allowances" for eight major categories of plants based 
upon type of fuel and historical emissions rate; some units even receive greater allowances 
than their historical emissions. Id. § 7651c, tbl. A. An "allowance" is a permission to emit 
one ton of sulfur dioxide. Id. § 7651a(3). 
90 See id. §§ 7561a-o. 
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ble. "91 This requirement, however, does not require waste reduction; 
sources are free to limit themselves to reducing toxicity.92 Moreover, 
the requirement says virtually nothing about the content of the waste 
minimization program.93 A generator could achieve volume reduc-
tions by treating existing wastes, rather than changing manufacturing 
processes to reduce the quantity of waste generated.94 
III. MIXED STRATEGIES 
The legislature need not limit itself to a single goal, even with re-
spect to a single regulatory program. Congress has frequently de-
manded that EPA pursue both acceptable risk and pollution reduction 
goals simultaneously.95 Pursuing a mixed strategy can, of course, intro-
duce unanticipated complexities into the agency's implementation ef-
forts, and it can on rare occasions result in conflicts between goals. 
A. More Stringent Standard Prevails 
Perhaps the simplest mixed strategy is one in which Congress re-
quires the agency to establish standards aimed at meeting both pollu-
tion reduction and acceptable risk goals, and further provides that the 
more stringent standard must be achieved. For example, the Clean Wa-
ter Act requires EPA to promulgate industry-wide standards for direct 
dischargers of toxic pollutants, requiring the installation of the best 
available control technology.96 Effluent limitations based upon these 
standards must be met regardless of the quality of the receiving wa-
ters.97 But if the effluent reductions that the technology-based stan-
dards require do not result in water quality that protects the public 
health with an ample margin of safety-an acceptable risk goal-then 
EPA must promulgate standards requiring still further reductions in 
discharges, including plant closures.98 In addition, if the source is dis-
charging into a stream segment for which state-promulgated water 
quality standards have not been achieved, meeting the technology-
based effluent limitations will not be sufficient.99 A source's permit 
91 [d. § 6922(b). 
92 See id. 
95 See 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b). 
94 See id. 
95 See, e.g., 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1387. 
96 See discussion supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
97 See 33 u.s.c. § 1317(a)(2). 
98 See id. 
99 [d. 
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must require it to meet any more stringent requirement necessary to 
achieve the state water quality standard. IOO Moreover, no permit may be 
issued to a new source, even if it meets the technology-based require-
ments for its industrial category, if its discharge will cause or contribute 
to a violation of state water quality standards. IOI 
Congress has adopted a similar mixed strategy under the Clean Air 
Act for major stationary sources in "non attainment" areas. As we have 
seen, new and modified major stationary sources in a nonattainmen t 
area must achieve the "lowest achievable emissions rate," and existing 
sources must install "reasonably available control technology." Even 
definitive proof that the area will attain the ambient air quality stan-
dards by the deadline does not relieve stationary sources of their pollu-
tion reduction obligations. At the same time, the state implementation 
plans must provide for the attainment of the national ambient air qual-
ity standards by the statutory deadlines, quite apart from the require-
ments on stationary sources. IT installing the required technologies will 
not bring about sufficient reductions to meet the standards, then even 
more stringent requirements will be necessary.102 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 created a zoning scheme 
in which all areas meeting the national ambient air quality standards 
must be divided into three classes. The statute assigns to each class an 
increment, which consists of an additional concentration above the 
baseline concentration to which air quality for the relevant pollutant 
may be allowed to deteriorate in areas assigned to that class. The base-
line concentration for an area is determined as of the time of the first 
application for a permit under the program for that area.103 Once in-
crements have been assigned to an area, the state implementation plan 
must ensure that the increments are never exceeded.104 Unlike the 
NAAQS, the increments are not designed to protect public health or 
welfare. Indeed, the actual air quality allowable in a clean air area is not 
even determined until the application for the first permit for a major 
emitting facility. Air quality in a clean air area can permissibly be al-
lowed to deteriorate to the concentrations specified in the NAAQS 
through the addition of facilities that are not major emitting facilities. 
100Id. § 1311 (b) (1) (C). 
101 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2004). 
102 See discussion supra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
103 42 U.S.C. §§ 7472-7473. The concentration can never be allowed to exceed the 
NAAQS. Id. § 7473(b) (4). 
104Id. § 7471. The state may. with certain limitations and subject to certain procedures. 
reclassifY an area to one in which a greater increment is allowed. See id. § 7474. 
2004] The Goals of Environmental Legislation 547 
Thus, the requirement that the states protect the increments is more 
clearly aimed at impeding the deterioration of air quality down to the 
level at which health or welfare may be at risk. The legislative goal thus 
lies somewhere between zero risk/preservationist and significant 
risk/protective, depending upon the timing of the first permit applica-
tion and on how the state classifies the area.105 
Superimposed upon the classification scheme for clean air areas is 
the previously discussed general requirement that all new and modified 
major emitting facilities install the "best available con trol technol-
ogy. "106 IT previously permitted sources have already consumed the in-
crement for an area, a new major facility cannot be constructed and an 
existing major facility cannot be modified to increase emissions, even if 
it is willing to install the best available technology.107 Conversely, a new 
or modified major emitting facility must install the best available tech-
nology, even if something less would still protect the relevant incre-
ment. For any given major emitting facility, the more stringent of the 
acceptable risk and pollution reduction goals prevails. lOS 
When the standard aimed at pollution reduction goals prevails 
under this mixed strategy, sources often complain that the result is 
inefficient. They are being asked to make expenditures to reduce pol-
lution even though some degree of contamination is not unaccept-
able. The government is requiring "technology for technology's sake." 
Yet the most stringent mixed strategy can be a necessary hedge 
against the huge uncertainties that becloud the process of setting ac-
ceptable risk standards. The future may reveal that the acceptable risk 
standards did not in fact reach acceptable risk goals, but by this time 
the technologies will have already been foregone and damage will 
have resulted. In the case of non threshold pollutants, a plausible case 
can also be made for the proposition that no additional risk is accept-
able as long as available technology can reduce that risk still further. It 
is, in other words, appropriate for society to insist that companies use 
their best efforts to reduce risks, even though the monies expended 
do not comport with the economist's cost-benefit calculus. 
When the standard aimed at acceptable risk goals prevails, the 
agency may have to face the difficult question of how to push beyond 
105 See discussion supra Part II.A. and accompanying notes. 
106 See discussion supra Part II.A. and accompanying notes. 
107 See Ala. Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting 
the argument that the permit process for major emitting facilities was the exclusive vehicle 
for protecting the prevention of significant deterioration increments). 
108 See discussion supra Part II.A. and accompanying notes 
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what is technologically feasible. IOO One possible answer is that one or 
more of the existing sources will have to stop discharging altogether. 
Politically accountable agencies like EPA, however, are extremely reluc-
tant to close down facilities to which the operators have devoted their 
best pollution control efforts. In cases in which an existing source is 
doing the best that it can, the agency frequently enters into an agree-
ment with the source that places it on a compliance schedule calling 
for greater reductions at some time in the future. When no technologi-
cal solution looms on the horizon, the agency may allow the source to 
continue discharging, but require it to engage in a research and devel-
opment program aimed at coming up with additional pollution reduc-
tion. l1O Although acceptable risk goals often trump pollution reduction 
goals in theory, they seldom do so in the real world in which plant 
shutdowns mean job loss and economic dislocation. 
B. Technology Focus with a Risk-Based Concession 
Congress has occasionally provided that the agency need not re-
quire sources to comply with technology-based limitations if greater 
discharges do not threaten the attainment of acceptable risk goals. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in the Benzene case, is an example of acceptable risk goals trump-
ing pollution reduction goals in cases in which the latter goals would 
require more stringent standards. As we have seen, the Court held that 
OSHA was powerless to require economically and technologically feasi-
ble health technologies to workplaces in which worker exposure to 
chemicals did not pose a "significant risk" to the workers.111 
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require EPA to estab-
lish NESHAPs for stationary sources reflecting the maximum achiev-
able control technology (MACT) for emitters of hazardous air pollut-
ants, a standard which rather clearly represents a best efforts goa1. l12 In 
the case of carcinogens, these standards must be met even if compli-
ance reduces the risks to exposed individuals to extremely low levels. 
The statute allows the agency to consider established health thresholds 
for pollutants for which such thresholds have been established, along 
109 When the pollution reduction goal is only "reasonable efforts," the agency may not 
have to face this dilemma if "best efforts" are capable of reaching acceptable risk goals. 
1\0 See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1975) (cop-
per smelter required to engage in research and development program aimed at achieving 
continuous controls on sulfur dioxide). 
111 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. 
1\2 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
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with an ample margin of safety.ll3 This suggests-but only very 
vaguely-that Congress may have adopted a mixed strategy with respect 
to sources that emit threshold pollutants. Maximum achievable tech-
nology may not be required if something less will ensure human expo-
sures below the threshold level plus an ample margin of safety. 
EPA may delete a category of sources of one or more hazardous 
pollutants from the list of categories, and thereby avoid the maximum 
achievable control technology requirement for that category, if cer-
tain risk-based conditions are met for all sources in the category. In 
the case of threshold pollutants, EPA must find that emissions from 
no source in the category will exceed "a level which is adequate to 
protect public health with an ample margin of safety and no adverse 
environmental effect will result. "1I4 In the case of non threshold pol-
lutants, EPA must find that no source in the category emits hazardous 
pollutants "in quantities which may cause a lifetime risk of cancer 
greater than one in one million to the individual in the population 
who is most exposed to emissions from the source."1I5 Thus, for such 
categories subject to deletion from the list, Congress has articulated a 
mixed strategy that is technology-based with a risk concession. 
The 1984 Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act provide for a phased prohibition of all land disposal of un-
treated hazardous wastes, except for some kinds of deep well injection, 
unless EPA expressly determines that one or more methods of land 
disposal is sufficient to protect human health and the environment for 
as long as the wastes remain hazardous.l 16 EPA may not, however, de-
termine that a method of land disposal is protective of human health 
unless an interested person demonstrates "to a reasonable degree of 
certainty that there will be no migration of hazardous constituents from 
the disposal unit or injection zone for as long as the wastes remain haz-
ardous. "117 Hazardous wastes can be disposed of in land disposal facili-
ties if they are treated in accordance with EPA's treatment regula-
tions. lIB The treatmen t standards must reflect "those levels or methods 
of treatment, if any, which substantially diminish the toxicity of the 
waste or substantially reduce the likelihood of migration of hazardous 
l\3 See 42 u.s.c. § 7412(d) (4) (2000). 
114 [d. § 7412(c) (9) (B) (ii). 
115 [d. § 7412(c) (9) (B) (i). 
116 [d. § 6924(g) (5). 
117 [d. § 6924(d)(l). 
118 See id. § 6924(a). 
550 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:529 
constituents from the waste so that short-term and long-term threats to 
human health and the environment are minimized. "119 
The Amendments precipitated a great debate over whether the 
above-quoted language allowed EPA to write feasibility-based treat-
ment standards without a risk-based concession. The Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit resolved this debate in 1989 when it held that EPA 
could lawfully require the application of "best demonstrated available 
technology" (BDAT) without a risk-based cap)20 The same court later 
rejected an industry contention that EPA was required to engage in 
comparative risk analysis--comparing the risks to human health and 
the environment of treatment of a waste by a particular BDAT with 
those inherent in land disposal of the same waste-in setting treat-
ment standards.121 Thus, the "land ban" program does not impose a 
risk-based concession to EPA's feasibility-based approach. 
C. Risk Focus with a Feasibility-Based Concession 
Congress sometimes tells an agency to pursue acceptable risk goals 
only up to the point at which that becomes infeasible. For example, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act empowers OSHA to set occupa-
tional health standards at the level "which most adequately assures, to 
the extent feasible, ... that no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health or functional capacity .... "122 As we have seen, the 
Court held in the Benzene case that in promulgating occupational safety 
standards, OSHA may only address significant risks.12!l In cases in which 
it is not feasible to reduce employee exposure to levels that no longer 
pose significant risks, the statute appears to demand that the standard 
be set at the feasible level, even if that leaves employees exposed to 
significant risks. The theory may be that it is better to leave employees 
exposed to significant risks than to regulate them out of their jobs. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)(I). 
120 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 886 F.2d 355, 3~5 
(D.C. Cir. 1989). Since EPA had not adequately explained why it took that approach, the 
standard was remanded. Id. at 364-71. The court was afraid that EPA had simply kow-
towed to some influential congresspersons. Id. at 365. 
121 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 906 F.2d 729, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
122 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 
125 See discussion supra Part I.B. and accompanying notes. 
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IV. COST-BENEFIT "SUPERMANDATES" 
The foregoing description of the existing environmental statutes 
reveals a rich array of regulatory approaches aimed at achieving a vari-
ety of goals. Although Congress has sometimes expressed a preference 
for balancing the costs of pollution reduction against the resulting 
benefits, it has more often relegated cost to one of many considera-
tions, and it has rarely required the agency to quantifY and monetize 
the benefits of pollution control requirements.l 24 The sponsors of sev-
eral bills in the 104th Congress, however, attempted to bring about a 
dramatic change to the existing law by imposing a uniform cost-benefit 
balancing goal on all environmental regulation. An example is House 
Bill 1022, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, which in 
turn was an essential component of the regulatory proposals of the Re-
publican party's Contract with America;125 it would have required fed-
eral agencies involved in health, safety, and environmental regulation 
to prepare detailed risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses to ac-
company "major" rules through the internal agency decision making 
process and to become a part of the record on judicial review. 126 Al-
though agencies have, pursuant to executive order, been preparing 
similar analyses for rules having an impact of at least $100 million on 
the economy, the executive orders have always been carefully drafted to 
prevent the agencies from relying upon, or even considering, such 
analyses when precluded by statute.127 
In a major departure from past administrative practice, however, 
House Bill 1022 provided: "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
federal law, the decision criteria of subsection (a) shall supplement 
and, to the extent there is a conflict, supersede the decision criteria 
for rulemaking otherwise applicable under the statute pursuant to 
which the rule is promulgated. "128 The foregoing analysis of the goals 
of the existing environmental statutes should reveal how this appar-
ently innocuous "supermandate" provision would in fact have radi-
cally re-oriented all of the statutes administered by federal agencies 
charged with protecting public health, safety, and the environment. 
124 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b) (6). This 1996 addition to the Safe Drinking Water 
Act permits EPA to promulgate a "maximum containment level" at a level "that maximizes 
health risk reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits." [d. 
125 See 141 Congo Rec. 2460 (1995). 
126 SeeH.R. 9, 104th Congo §§ 414-15, 421 (1995). 
127 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51744 (Oct. 4, 1993). 
12BH.R.9, 104thCong.§422(b) (1995). 
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A cost-benefit supermandate would have the effect of imposing a 
reasonable risk or reasonable efforts concession on all other health, 
safety, and environmental programs. This could have the advantage of 
encouraging more efficient regulation. Critics of the existing regula-
tory programs have often bemoaned their potential to waste scarce 
resources. Forcing agencies to pursue zero risk/preservationist goals 
sends them off in pursuit of what Justice Breyer has characterized as 
'''the last 10 percent'" of risk reduction, an exercise that, according to 
the critics, rarely represents an efficient use of resources.t29 Even 
eliminating "significant" risks can be inefficient, if the costs of reduc-
ing those risks are greater than the benefits. Similarly, an agency in 
pursuit of a best efforts goal will, according to the critics, usually 
reach the point at which the benefits of more stringent pollution re-
duction technologies are not justified by the costs before they reach 
the top-of-the-line technology.13o 
A cost-benefit supermandate, however, has several important 
drawbacks. It would as a practical matter embroil every health, safety, 
and environmental rulemaking initiative in endless debates about the 
costs of the relevant pollution reduction technologies, the probable 
pollutant levels in the receiving media, the effect of the pollutants on 
exposed humans and other environmental entities, and the value of 
the human lives or environmental entities at stake. l3l The impossibil-
ity of reducing the host of uncertainties and imponderables involved 
in such reductionist efforts is precisely what has dissuaded Congress 
in most instances from prescribing reasonable risk and reasonable 
efforts goals in the environmental statutes. 
Moreover, this highly analytical exercise will, as a practical matter, 
be carried out by experts with training in cost analysis, risk assessment, 
toxicology, etc.132 Although most of the important issues that must be 
resolved in applying cost-benefit analysis to health and environmental 
129 BREYER, supm note 20, at 11-29; see generally JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF 
TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION (1988). 
19o See FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH Eco-
NOMIC INCENTIVES 9 (1977); ALLEN KNEESE & CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 69-84 (1975); Robert M. Solow, The Economist's Approach to Pollution 
and Its Control, 173 SCI. 498, 498-99 (1971); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and 
the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1985). 
131 See McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY, supm note 41, at 111-64. 
132 See Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO LJ. 2341, 2369 
(2002) (criticizing Professor Sunstein's enthusiasm for cost-benefit analyses undertaken by 
experts, "many of whom have devoted their careers to criticizing health, safety, and envi-
ronmen tal regulation"). 
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regulation are in fact science/policy questions for which science does 
not provide answers,133 the process of applying the cost-benefit deci-
sional criteria to regulatory alternatives in inherently opaque to public 
scrutiny. Cost-benefit analysis often deals the affected public out of the 
decisionmaking process for no good reason.134 
Finally, even assuming that a cost-benefit supermandate would 
lead to more efficient regulation, it is unclear why economic 
efficiency should be elevated to the status of meta-value to the exclu-
sion of other important societal goals. 135 Applying a cost-benefit 
measure to all health, safety and environmental standards would have 
important distributional impacts that would on at least some occa-
sions outweigh efficiency considerations.136 In addition, since much 
environmental damage is effectively beyond the reach of the tort sys-
tem, pollution will still produce winners and losers. A just society can 
rationally demand that the winners do the best that they can in ad-
vance to reduce the risk to the 10sers,137 whether or not that level of 
effort meets the economist's cost-benefit test. Similarly, society can 
rationally conclude that the winners not expose the losers to 
significant risks, or any risks at all, even though the winners can make 
a good case for the proposition that their gains would exceed the los-
ers' losses. 
CONCLUSION 
Public policy toward environmental pollution at the federal level has 
evolved throughout the last thirty years to meet society's changing needs 
and in response to new information about the impacts of federallegisla-
tion. It has not followed a single path; nor has it pursued a single goal. 
The richly diverse collection of federal statutes through which EPA im-
plements environmental policy reflects this history. Sometimes EPA regu-
133 See COMM. ON THE INSTITIlTIONAL MEANS FOR AsSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, 
NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., RISK AsSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. MANAGING THE 
PROCESS 1-7 (1983); Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks 
Through Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 271,273 (1990); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discre-
tion, supra note 51, at 805-06. 
134 See DAVID BOLLIER &JOAN CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM HARM 200-01 (1986); Don-
ald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk 
Assessment, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 604-05 (1992). 
135 See Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 
48-52 (1986). 
136 See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Para-
digm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 3, 21-23, 52-53 (1998). 
137 See discussion supra Part I.C. and accompanying notes. 
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lations must meet pollution reduction goals; sometimes they must meet 
acceptable risk goals; and sometimes they must pursue mixed goals. This 
should come as no surprise in a diverse society like the United States. 
The resulting regulatory regime is by no means perfect, but Congress 
should be wary of simplistic attempts to impose perfection through 
unidimensional approaches to setting environmental policy. 
